



HISTORY

Paper 3 Interpretations Question

1 hour 15 minutes

You will need: Answer booklet (enclosed)

- Answer **one** question from **one** section only.

Section B: The Holocaust

- Follow the instructions on the front cover of the answer booklet. If you need additional answer paper, ask the invigilator for a continuation booklet.

- The total mark for this paper is 40.

- The number of marks for each question or part question is shown in brackets [].

[Turn over

Answer **one** question from **one** section only.

Section A: The origins of the First World War

- 1** Read the extract and then answer the question.

Whether Austria would have pressed on to the destruction of Serbia without its blank cheque from Germany is still a matter of controversy.

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Landlocked Germany could only expand at the expense of its neighbours and in so doing destroy a European order that had been peacefully established for a hundred years.

What can you learn from this extract about the interpretation and approach of the historian who wrote it? Use the extract and your knowledge of the origins of the First World War to explain your answer.

[40]

Section B: The Holocaust

- 2** Read the extract and then answer the question.

That Hitler gave an oral order sometime in the spring or summer of 1941 for the overall extermination of the Jews of Europe is highly probable, but cannot be proven with absolute certainty on the basis of existing documents.

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But many of those who had laughed would not do so anymore.

What can you learn from this extract about the interpretation and approach of the historian who wrote it? Use the extract and your knowledge of the Holocaust to explain your answer. [40]

Section C: The origins and development of the Cold War

3 Read the extract and then answer the question.

A prominent characteristic of Stalin was his exceptional suspiciousness. He was constantly afraid of almost everyone around him. In the post-war period, there were no more mass purges in the Soviet Union but continual terror, as in his old age he became if anything even more paranoid. In dealings with foreign powers, he was likewise always ready to believe that any proposal concealed an evil intention, that any compromise was a trap. Few of his colleagues could be trusted to act abroad, and no one, even the faithful Molotov, was given any freedom of action. Soviet embassies became closed and barred fortresses. As a result, negotiation was difficult and usually pointless, and contacts with the uncontrolled outside world were to be avoided as far as possible. Normal contacts which might have made friends for the Soviet Union were despised, as were trade links which might have won some influence. Flattered by all around him, Stalin was not disposed to appreciate unpleasant realities thrust at him by foreign powers. Given the lack of honest and open discussion in his regime, any myth could pass for truth. Even though Soviet diplomats often prepared themselves well, the Americans were continually amazed at how misinformed their Russian counterparts were about the United States. Far from appreciating the potential utility of the United Nations, the Stalinists reduced their already slight participation in it and hardly used it except as a forum to attack the West. Aside from its satellites, the Soviet Union was friendless in the world. Caution and pressure against the outside, sharply contrasting the peaceful, socialist and progressive against the capitalist, oppressive and imperialistic, helped to consolidate the Soviet sphere. That it made impossible any further expansion was of secondary importance, as Stalin merely concentrated on holding on to the great gains already made. If the rest of the world reacted with hostility, this was taken to prove how right Stalin was.

In the Cold War, the ageing Stalin raised intolerance and isolationism to a new height. The capitalist world was attacked as never before. The unholy outside world belonged to the class enemy. Anyone who was not wholeheartedly with him was against him. Soviet diplomacy and propaganda were accordingly often ignorant and rude whilst at the same time unscrupulous and superficially clever. This intolerant approach made ineffective even apparently reasonable Soviet initiatives for the reduction of tension and deprived the Soviet Union of any credit it might have deserved. Stalin's policy in the Greek Civil War was moderate and prudent, but uncompromising attitudes and language made it seem hostile. To a very large extent the image of Stalin as fiercely aggressive was created by his violence of language rather than deeds: from insults against opponents rather than real injuries inflicted. It was very hard for such a government as Stalin's, arrogant and tolerating no dissent at home, to see that mild and indirect tactics would usually have been far more effective, particularly for the security of the Soviet Union, which was its foremost concern. However, the overall effect of Stalin's suspicion and isolationism was to reduce his interest in foreign policies. It would have been foolish indeed for the Soviet Union, far weaker than the United States, to be really aggressive. It was willing to brag and bluster and try the patience of the Americans, but Soviet leaders were well aware of their military limitations. Even the first Soviet nuclear explosion, in the autumn of 1949, was treated very carefully and with uncharacteristic lack of boasting, probably to minimise chances of a dangerous American reaction.

What can you learn from this extract about the interpretation and approach of the historian who wrote it? Use the extract and your knowledge of the Cold War to explain your answer. [40]